few compromises and concessions, Karimov was able to establish control over that restive area.
Karimov, with his sharp political acumen, opted for a path that was grounded neither in Islam nor in ethnic nationalism. His credo was wholly secular, although he paid lip-service to Islam when creating a new Uzbekistani national identity. While focusing on the Uzbeks, who comprised the overwhelming majority of his citizenry, and on the Uzbek tongue, which became the state language,2 this new identity highlighted the new state's historical heritage as the region's leading body politic, heir to the great Timurid Empire of Timurlane.3 Indeed, Timurlane has been adopted as a -if not the -father of the Uzbek nation, "the embodiment of Uzbek national identity."4 He is joined by other illustrious medieval scholars and writers who lived in Central Asia, not necessarily even in the territory of modern Uzbekistan, and have been similarly and anachronistically "annexed," like al-Khwarazmi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). 5 To ensure the success of his enterprise, Karimov suppressed the Islamic resurgence of the first half of the 1990s, closed down most of the madrasas, or seats of Islamic learning, that mushroomed in this period, as well as a large number of mosques, instituting draconic legislation on the registration of prayer-houses of all faiths. As the great majority of these prayer-houses were mosques, the Muslim faith was necessarily the most affected by these laws. Forum 18, a Norwegian-based human rights organization dedicated to promoting religious freedom and recording religious persecution in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and a number of other countries, reports periodically cases of persecution of Muslims (and adherents of other faiths) in Uzbekistan, mostly on the pretext of Islamic "extremism." At the same time, Karimov incorporated a number of Islamic customs into his new ethos; for instance, he made both Ruza Hayit (`Id al-Fitr) and the first day of Qurbon
